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A THREE DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF
STADIUM OWNER LIABILITY IN
SPECTATOR INJURY CASES
JosHuA E. KASTENBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Stadium and event-site owners are under a duty to provide reason-
ably safe premises for spectators at sporting events. In turn, spectators
may find that in certain jurisdictions, they are limited to, or outright
barred from, recovering damages resulting from injuries which occur at
the event. This article analyzes the duties placed on the stadium and
event-site owners to prevent such injuries, as well as the defenses avail-
able to stadium and event-site owners.
Spectator injuries constitute a large area of negligence law and there
is a commonality among the various spectator sports. This article ana-
lyzes stadium/event-site owner liability in a three dimensional model.
The purpose of a three dimensional model is to unweave the complex
fabric which constitutes liability for spectator injuries.
Various sports are independently analyzed in the first section, which
represents one dimension. Analyzing specific spectator sports is some-
what traditional. That is, law review articles typically analyze the risks
inherent to spectators in the more popular sports by breaking these
sports into separate categories. Baseball has for a long time received the
most attention.1 However, golf, hockey, auto racing, wrestling, and a
variety of other spectator sports have seen a significant number of spec-
tator injuries.
Part II assesses three common types of jurisdictions which affect the
stadium/event-site owner's ability to defend against negligence actions.
Jurisdictions which continue to recognize contributory negligence as a
defense will allow primary assumption of risk to be raised as a complete
bar to recovery. Comparative negligence jurisdictions allow for a secon-
dary assumption of risk to be raised by defendant stadium/event-site
owners against negligence actions. The laws of California, New York,
and Texas are analyzed to provide a basis for how comparative negli-
* B.A., UCLA, 1989; J.D., Marquette University Law School, 1996. Captain, USAF,
Judge Advocate. The author would like to thank Professor Jack Kircher and Elizabeth Chan.
1. See generally HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL, THE EARLY YEARS (1960). See also
SPORTS AND THE LAW 24 (Charles E. Quirk ed. 1996).
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gence jurisdictions weigh a plaintiff's contribution under a secondary as-
sumption of risk defense. Finally, states which place a higher duty than
reasonableness through the use of statutory exceptions are analyzed.
Wisconsin, through its use of a safe place statute, provides the best ex-
ample of such a jurisdiction. Thus, the second section constitutes a sec-
ond dimension of spectator liability.
Part III addresses the various types of injuries to which spectators are
more commonly prone. Inclusive in this list are both injuries caused by
other spectators and injuries which occur to third-party employees, such
as the media on the sidelines. Because injuries arising from the nature of
the sport itself are addressed throughout the previous two sections, they
are not discussed in section three. By analyzing common injuries inde-
pendently, a third dimension is created. Thus, each section represents a
different tort dimension in the stadium/event-site owner context.
II. DUTrms ON VARIOUS EVENTS
It will be helpful to the reader to introduce the concept of spectator
liability by first examining typical standards which apply to the various
sports. Different classes of sports are often analyzed under different
standards. Thus, baseball, hockey, golf, auto-racing, and "fighting
matches" will be analyzed because these represent distinct classes of
spectator sports. Baseball has been a model for studying stadium/
event-site owner liability because, as the nation's pastime, it represents
the basic threshold standards of liability. In spectator injury cases arising
from baseball, courts generally assume that most people comprehend the
intricacies of the game. Hockey, though gaining in popularity, is a sport
where a spectator's knowledge of the event cannot necessarily be as-
sumed. Golf is a unique event in that there is no stadium, enclosed
structure, or set field of play. Thus, golf requires a special analysis be-
cause of its uniqueness. Auto racing can be representative of most types
of racing in that high speed vehicles, such as motorcycles, dragster, stock
cars, "funny cars," horses, or harness racing, present problems in ensur-
ing spectator safety. Finally, "fighting matches," typified both by their
high level of fan involvement and small spectator base, represent a
unique type of event. Although most of the case law involves wrestling
matches, the same analysis applies to boxing, "tough man," and even
martial arts contests.
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A. Baseball
For over a century, baseball has been the most popular spectator
sport in America. 2 In the early days of baseball, the sport was dangerous
to both its participants and spectators. Until World War I, the game was
devoid of gloves, catchers' mitts and masks, protection for umpires, and
backstops, even at the professional level. It was generally assumed that
spectators who entered a ballpark assumed the risks of foul balls and
thrown bats.4 Thus, in a historical context, baseball has helped to define
negligence in a sports context.
The duty to reasonably provide a safe viewing area for baseball spec-
tators evolved after 1914 when liability for injuries caused by foul balls
and thrown bats were being challenged in the courts.5 By the late 1950s
several jurisdictions adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts on the
duty of a possessor of land/landowner to apply to stadium owners.6
However, the spectator's knowledge of both the sport and its accompa-
nying dangers remains a factor up to the present.7 Even today, most
jurisdictions have placed only a limited duty on stadium owners to
screen certain seats.8
2. SEYMOUR, supra note 1, at 6.
3. Id.
4. SPORTS AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 24. See also Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball &
Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 201 (1913).
5. See, e.g., James G. Gaspard, Spectator Liability in Basebalk Nobody Told Me I As-
sumed the Risk, 15 REv. Ln-IG. 229,232 (1996). See also Charles H. Perkins, Note, The Lia-
bility of the Proprietor of a Baseball Park for Injuries to Spectators Struck by Batted or Thrown
Balls, 1 WASH. U. L.Q. 434, 436 (1951).
6. See Texas by Adam Dante Corp. v. Sharpe, 483 S.W.2d 452, 454-55 (Tex. 1972).
7. See, e.g., Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co., 143 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App.
1913). Establishing the principle that "baseball" is our national game and the rules governing
it and the manner in which it is played and the dangers inherent incident thereto are matters
of common knowledge. Id. See also, Cincinnati Baseball Club. v. Eno, 147 N.E. 86, 87 (Ohio
1925). Ohio courts have held "in baseball games hard balls are thrown and batted with great
swiftness, that they are liable to be thrown or batted outside the lines of the diamond, and that
spectators in positions which may be reached by such balls assume the risk thereof. This
theory is fortified by the fact that such spectators can watch the ball and can thus usually avoid
being struck when a ball is directed toward them." Id-
Finally, in Gunther v. Charlotte Baseball Inc., 854 F.Supp. 424,427 (D.S.C. 1994), a federal
court held that a plaintiff's ignorance of the game is no excuse. Id. (citing Brisson v. Minneap-
olis Baseball & Atheltic Ass'n, 240 N.W. 903 (Minn. 1932).
8. See Maythnier v. Rush, 225 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. 1967); Springer v. East Noble Scholl Corp.,
495 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Conclough v. Orleans Parish School Board, 166 So.2d 647
(La. Ct. App. 1964); Brisson, 240 N.W. at 903; Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231
S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950); Jones v. Three River Management Corp., 394 A.2d 546 (Pa. 1978);
Hamilton v. Salt Lake City Corp., 237 P.2d 841 (Utah 1951).
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The standard of reasonableness as a duty on stadium owners is best
illustrated in the recent Illinois case Yates v. Chicago National League
Ball Club.9 In Yates, the plaintiff, a minor, attended a Chicago Cubs
baseball game with her father and two other friends.10 The plaintiff was
seated in an area near, but not covered by, the protective screen behind
home plate." During the game, the plaintiff was struck by a foul ball
and suffered severe injuries which required a five day hospital stay.'2
The plaintiff's father testified that he had been to Wrigley Field a
number of times prior to the incident, that he was aware of the danger,
and that he had requested protective seating.' 3 This latter point was
contested by the stadium owner.' 4 The trial court fashioned a special
inadequate screening instruction to the jury. The jury found the team
liable for $67,500.15
The appellate court then framed the issues that the owner raised on
appeal in a manner favorable to the plaintiff.' 6 First, the court stated
that in the context of negligence law, a ballpark owner does not abso-
lutely insure the safety of his invitees on his premises. At the same time,
the owner owes a duty to those spectators. 17 This duty is satisfied if the
ballpark owner "provides screen[ed protection] for the most dangerous
part of the grandstand and for those who may be reasonably anticipated
to desire protected seats."' Because Yates alleged inadequate screen-
ing, there was a factual question in this case. The jury had found that the
stadium owner had breached the duty to provide adequate screening,
and the appellate court upheld this finding.
The appellate court also disregarded the stadium owner's disclaimer
on the back of the ticket, reasoning that such a disclaimer could not form
the basis of a defense because the print on the ticket was too small to be
legible.' 9 Finally, the ballpark owner argued that Wrigley Field con-
9. 595 N.E.2d 570 (!. 1992).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. IML
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 578 (citing Maythnier, 225 N.E.2d at 87).
18. Id. (citing Maythnier, 225 N.E.2d at 87).
19. Yates, 595 N.E.2d at 581 (quoting RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cnt. c).
Although this article does not encompass exculpatory clauses and thus does not analyze ex-
press assumption of risk, this remains a valid point. A plaintiffs acceptance of a ticket con-
taining a discaimer in fine print on the back is not binding for the purposes of asserting
express assumption of risk. Id.
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formed to industry standards. However, the Illinois Court recognized
that in certain jurisdictions, a ballpark owner is not always absolved of
liability once he or she provides adequate screening.20
Yates is helpful in examining the duty to provide spectator safety for
a number of reasons. First, baseball represents a threshold level in de-
termining duties to spectators. Second, the court held that if the stadium
owner failed to meet one of the duties, liability could attach. These du-
ties were defined as providing adequate screening to spectators who de-
sired protection. Thus, the screening must not only be adequate in its
design, but there must be enough of it to satisfy those customers who are
concerned about their safety.
B. Hockey
The game of hockey is inherently dangerous to unprotected specta-
tors. The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that "the omnipresent
specter of a deflected Mario Lemieux2 ' missile whizzing toward specta-
tors seated at center ice is as inherent to the sport of hockey as the un-
nerving probability of a Von Hayes2' rocket flying towards patrons
sitting in first base box seats is to a baseball game."'  Unlike baseball,
hockey spectators have not made a mini-sport out of catching errant
pucks in mid-flight. Moreover, hockey does not enjoy the universal spec-
tator base that baseball has been accustomed to. As a result, the ques-
tion of a plaintiff's knowledge of the dangers of the game has come
under review.
Typically, a hockey rink owner's duty to spectators is to provide pro-
tective seating throughout the rink. 24 However, the level of acceptable
protection seems to vary between sites. In Gilchrist v. City of Troy, 5 the
New York Court of Appeals held that a hockey rink owner's duty is
satisfied only when two conditions are met. First, the owner must "pro-
vide screening around the area behind the hockey goals, where the dan-
20. Yates, 595 N.E.2d at 582 (citing Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45
(Ill. App. 1992)). Interestingly, while the owner argued that the plaintiff should have been
aware of the danger of foul balls and thrown bats, the owner also asserted that he was una-
ware of the danger to a spectator in the section in which the plaintiff was seated. The court
responded to this by stating "[t]he Cubs zealously maintained throughout this litigation that
the hazard in question was open and obvious. The suggestion that the Cubs may have been
unaware of this hazard is somewhat ironic. It need not be addressed." Id,
21. He is a current player for the Pittsburgh Penguin's Hockey Club.
22. He is a former Philadelphia Phillies baseball player noted for his batting power.
23. Pestalozzi v. Philadelphia Flyers, Ltd., 576 A.2d 72 (Pa. 1990).
24. See, e.g., Gilchrist v. City of Troy, 495 N.Y.S. 781 (N.Y. App. 1985).
25. Id.
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ger of being struck by a puck is the greatest."' Second, the screening
must be "of sufficient extent to provide adequate protection for as many
spectators as may be reasonably be expected to desire to view the game
from behind such screening."2 7 Thus, the Gilchrist holding was substan-
tially similar to the duty of reasonableness discussed previously in the
Yates baseball case.
The adequate screening standard for hockey was addressed four
years after Gilchrist by the New York Court in Rosa v. County of Nas-
sau.28 In Rosa, a young spectator was injured by a puck while attending
a New York Islanders hockey game.29 The protective plexiglass screen-
ing in the plaintiff's section was three feet above the ice boards, which
were approximately three feet above the ice.30 Thus, the spectator was
afforded six feet of protection from the ice to the first row seating. The
court held that the protective screening satisfied the duty of care owed
by the stadium owner, despite the fact that the screening did not totally
eliminate the risk of spectator injury.3 ' The court further held that if
stadium owners were required to completely eliminate risks to specta-
tors, such a requirement would create an undue burden on the stadium
owners of being insurers of their patrons' safety.
Finally, as to whether a spectator's knowledge of the risks involved in
attending a hockey game are relevant, a Pennsylvania Court in Pes-
talozzi v. Philadelphia Flyers32 stated that "the risk of being struck by an
errant puck.., is common and reasonably foreseeable." 33 The court
further held that it found no reason to differentiate between baseball
and hockey in regard to the spectator's knowledge of the sport.' How-
ever, it is important to note that all of these hockey cases occurred in
cold-weather states where hockey predominates. As the sport gains
26. Id. at 783.
27. Id. The court acknowledged that "there can be little doubt that it is economically and
practically more feasible to screen the entire perimeter of the playing surface of a hockey
game than for a baseball game. Indeed... many hockey rinks at which professional and
college games are played have screening around the entire perimeter of the skating surface.
Based upon the wording in Akins, however, it is apparent that the economics and practicality
in the field did not play a direct role in the court's holding. Rather, the practical realities of
this sporting event were given great weight." Id. (citing Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist.,
424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1951)).
28. 544 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 653.
31. Id.
32. 595 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. 1991).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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popularity in the southwestern part of the United States, it will be inter-
esting to see how courts deal with the plaintiff's knowledge of the event
in question.
C. Golf
Golf presents a set of difficulties not present in most other spectator
sports.35 The most successful golf-related law suits are those brought
against the owner of the course on which a tournament was held. 6 This
is because golf courses still have a duty to provide reasonably safe prem-
ises to their spectators, but the hazards are harder to define.37
Analyzing course owner liability is problematic because there is little
predictability as to where a shot will land after a player strikes the ball.
There are a number of cases helpful in analyzing course owner liability.
In Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club,'3  an Illinois Court decided that
there were two important aspects to deciding liability, and both aspects
were questions for the jury.39 First, a question arose as to whether the
golf course owner failed to design and maintain a reasonably safe golf
course.40 Second, the court determined that in order to weigh the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence, it is essential to gauge the plaintiff's knowl-
edge of the risks inherent in the sport of golf.41 Thus, under this
standard, if an injured spectator had a knowledge of the game of golf, a
jury may find that the spectator assumed the risk of injury. However, if
the spectator's knowledge of golf is minimal, the jury might find for the
injured plaintiff. While the court raised the issue of whether a duty ex-
35. See WALTER B. CHAMPION, JR., SPoRs LAW IN A NutrsHmLL 108 (1983). Unlike
baseball where there is some predictability to the flight of a home run or foul ball, there is far
less predictability to a golf ball in flight. Although assumption of risk remains a salient de-
fense, golf courses and sponsors are still held to provide reasonably safe premises for the
spectators.
Typically, the key to a course owner's liability is whether the defendant had reason to
expect harm in the plaintiff from an obvious risk in circumstances where the plaintiff's atten-
tion might be distracted from the risk, causing him to forget to protect himself against harm.
36. Karen M. Vieira, Fore! May Just Be Par For the Course, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
181, 198 (1994). See also Thomas Logan, Comment, Fore! Liability to Spectators at Golf Tour-
naments, 13 AM. JUR. TIAL ADVo. 1207 (1990).
37. CAMPmON, supra note 35, at 108.
38. 481 N.E.2d 1037 (II1. Ct. App. 1985). In this case, the spectator was injured at the
concession stand while attending her first golf tournament.
39. Id
40. Id
41. Id
19961
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ists to warn spectators against the dangers inherent in the viewing of
golf, the court never provided an answer.42
The duty to warn spectators of dangers inherent in the viewing of golf
tournaments can be extrapolated from Hathaway v. Tascosa Country
Club, Inc.43 In this case, a Texas Court held that since a golf player is
under a duty to warn other golf players of possible dangers by yelling
"fore," there is a duty of a course owner to enforce this custom by re-
minding participants to adhere to it.44 The Hathaway decision suggests
that, unlike a baseball stadium, a golf course owner may have a duty to
warn spectators about the risks inherent in golf.
In Grisim v. Tapemark Charity Pro-Am Golf Tournament,45 a specta-
tor was injured at a tournament while seated approximately fifty feet
from the edge of the green. 6 However, in this case, the spectator chose
not to sit in the designated seating area, but instead sat under a tree at an
angle more amenable to being hit by a golf ball. The court then held that
the spectator "assumed the risk to protect herself from injury and the
dangers incidental to the game 'as would be apparent to a reasonable
person in the exercise of due care.' "7 As a result, the course owner was
held immune from liability.
If a general standard for golf course owners exists from these cases, it
is that providing adequate screening, seating, and other natural protec-
tion and warnings will probably immunize course owners against liability
from negligence.
D. Auto-Racing
Track owners are under a duty to exercise reasonable care for the
safety of spectators in attendance. As in the case of all other sports,
track owners are not insurers of the patrons safety and are generally not
liable, unless they fail to act in a reasonable manner. This duty consists
of providing reasonable protections. The problem is twofold: (1) the
42. Id. at 1040. The court acknowledged the plaintiff's contention that the course omers
failed to warn of the dangerous area, but did not address the issue as a duty to the course
owner.
43. 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App. 1993).
44. Id. at 616-617. See also Bill McNabb, Are Sports Torts Now Par For the Course? The
Reckless Disregard Standard For Sport Participant Liability, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 723, 726
(1994).
45. 394 N.W.2d 261 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 265.
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injuries caused from flying auto parts, or the auto itself, are sometimes
lethal;4 and (2) almost all injuries are foreseeable.49
Nonetheless, courts have effectively dealt with ths problem. In Capi-
tol Raceway Promotions, Inc. v. Smith,5" a Maryland Appeals Court held
that insufficient netting constitutes negligence. 1 Thus, where a track
owner knows of auto parts flying over netting into the stands, there is a
presumption of negligence on the owner. In Richoux v. Herbert,5 2 a
Louisiana Court held that the liability on a track owner is predicated on
an owner's failure to observe defects in the premises. Thus, Louisiana
places a duty on the track owner to regularly inspect defects which can
lead to spectator injury.
Other jurisdictions support the Richoux standard. In Lane v. Eastern
Carolina Drivers Assoc.,5 3 a North Carolina Court held that the failure
to furnish adequate barriers would constitute negligence where the track
owner had observed, or should have observed, the dragsters nearing the
top of the barriers. 4
E. "Fighting Matches"
Professional wrestling, martial arts, "tough man," and lower ranked
boxing matches are unique in that the level of spectator participation
typically exceeds other sports.5 5 Because there is a lack of case law re-
garding all but wrestling events, this section concentrates on that activity.
Yet, the reader may extrapolate liability thresholds to other "fighting
matches."
One court characterized wresting matches as undignified affairs,
where the spectators possess unusual behaviors and both the partici-
pants' and the spectators' manner is neither gentle nor refined. 6 There
are two typical causes of spectator injuries in fighting matches: injuries
caused by participants to the spectators when the fight extends beyond
the ring (e.g., when a wrestler is thrown from the ring onto a spectator),
and injuries caused by the participants assaulting spectators. 7 In regard
48. See, e.g., Harding v. Chicago Park Dist., 339 N.E.2d 779 (fI1. App. 1975).
49. See, e.g., Atlantic Rural Exposition, Inc. v. Fagan, 77 S.E.2d 368 (Va. 1953).
50. 332 A.2d 238 (Mo. App. 1974).
51. Id.
52. 449 So.2d 491 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
53. 117 S.E.2d 737 (N.C. 1961).
54. Id.
55. Walter T. Champion, At the 01' Ball Game and Beyond. Spectators and the Potential
For Liability, 14 AM. J. TRiAL Anvoc. 495, 502 (1991).
56. Reynolds v. Deep South Sports, Inc., 211 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
57. Id.
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to the former, the liability level is simple. As in the case of baseball, it is
up to the jury to examine the extent to which safety precautions were
created by the event-site owner.58 However, the idea of a wrestler as-
saulting a spectator raises an interesting question as to whether such an
action is foreseeable or even part of the event itself.59 A majority of
jurisdictions presently hold that a site owner/promoter is liable for the
actions of his/her participants.60 For example, in both Pierce v.
Murnick 1 and Massey v. Jim Crockett Promotions,62 both courts held
that a promoter or owner may be held liable for the actions of the con-
testants outside the ring. In both cases, wrestlers had exited the ring and
attacked spectators.
III. COMMON DEFENSES
This section analyzes assumption of risk defenses in the spectator lia-
bility context. The section also discusses greater duties on stadium/
event-site owners as a result of legislative action.
Jurisdictions in the United States utilize a variety of negligence stan-
dards. Generally, there are two types of recognized negligence stan-
dards: contributory negligence and comparative negligence. 63
However, there are extensive variations on each, particularly the latter.
Of the two, contributory negligence is older and places a higher standard
of proof on the plaintiff.64 In the purest form of contributory negligence,
which is no longer recognized, the plaintiff in a negligence case must
prove that he or she did not contribute in any way, shape, or form to the
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Pierce v. Murnick, 145 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1965). Holding that while the promoter is
not the insurer of the spectator's safety on the premises, he is under the duty to use reasonable
care to prevent injury through a defect in the condition of the premises or by the action of any
of the contestants in the ring. Id. at 12.
See also Massey v. Jim Crockett Promotions, 400 S.E.2d 876 (W. Va. 1990). Stating that a
promoter may be held liable for the actions of the wrestlers if their actions were foreseeable.
let Given the nature of the sport, the individual wrestler's temperament, and spectator in-
volvement, it seems likely that the wrestler's actions were foreseeable.
But see Frik v. Ensor, 557 So.2d 1022 (La. Ct. App. 1990) and Ramsey v. Kallio, 62 So.2d
146 (La. Ct. App. 1962). Louisiana has been reluctant to extend liability onto a premises
owner or promoter for the actions of wrestlers which fall outside the scope of the sport and yet
injure spectators.
61. See generally Pierce, supra note 60.
62. See generally Massey, supra note 60.
63. For a comprehensive table outlining both the comparative and contributory negli-
gence laws by state jurisdiction, see RICHARD A. LErrER, NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAws
304-307 (1994).
64. Id. at 303.
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injury." Thus, if a defendant can prove that the plaintiff contributed to
the injury, then the plaintiff is barred from recovery.
Comparative fault is more lenient to the plaintiff who contributes to
the injury.66 There are two sub-categories of comparative fault. In a
pure comparative fault scheme, the defendant is liable for the percent-
age of negligence which the court attributes to the defendant.67 Thus, if
a plaintiff is ninety percent negligent, the defendant(s) are liable for ten
percent of the plaintiff's injury. However, most comparative fault juris-
dictions employ a modified comparative fault/contributory negligence
scheme. Under such a scheme, where the plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence is greater than the defendant(s), the plaintiff will be barred from
recovery.
As a result of the above mentioned negligence schemes, there are
typically two defenses available. The appropriate defense used depends
on whether the jurisdiction recognizes contributory negligence or com-
parative negligence.61 Primary assumption of risk (originally titled "as-
sumption of risk"), which denotes that a spectator assumes certain risks
while attending sporting matches, is applicable in a contributory negli-
gence jurisdiction.6 9 Secondary (or "implied") assumption of risk is a
common defense in comparative negligence jurisdictions.70 There is a
commonality between the two types of assumption of risk. Both ac-
knowledge that there are inherent dangers in a given activity and that
the spectator is assuming the risk involved in attending the activity. This
article does not discuss the language on the back of purchased tickets,
which is intended to absolve stadium owners of liability for injury; there-
fore, the defense of express assumption of risk is not analyzed.7'
65. Note that the doctrine of contributory negligence has its origins in the 1809 English
case of Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep., at 927 (1809). See VictOR SCHWARTZ, COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 4 (1985).
The Butterfield court held that when a plaintiff's negligence contributes to an accident, he
can not recover damages from a defendant who negligently injures him. Id.
66. LErTER, supra note 63, at 303.
67. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
68. CHAMPION, supra note 35, at 104.
69. Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk in the Arena, On the Field, and in the Mosh
Pit, What Protection Does it Afford?, 13 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS LAW REv. 3 (1995).
70. Id. at 5.
71. For a statement of express assumption of risk, see Drago, supra note 69, at 3-4.
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A. Primary Assumption of Risk Defense in Contributory
Negligence Cases
Spectators are often at risk of injury while viewing a sporting event.
A common defense by stadium and event-site owners against charges of
negligence is primary assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk
denotes the denial of a duty by the defendant.72 Primary assumption of
risk as a complete defense applies only in contributory negligence juris-
dictions.73 Generally, under this doctrine, spectators are unlikely to re-
cover for injuries that result from the common feature of the event
itself.74 Thus, damages as a result of injury caused by a baseball or
hockey puck in the normal course of a game are non-recoverable.
Georgia is a jurisdiction which continues to view primary assumption
of risk as a viable defense. However, Georgia operates a combined com-
parative-contributory negligence scheme - if the plaintiff's negligence is
fifty percent or more, the plaintiff is barred from recovery.75 The Geor-
gia Court defined the elements of assumption of risk in Newman v. Col-
lins76 as: (1) a hazard or danger which is inconsistent with the safety of
the invitee; (2) the invitee must know and appreciate the danger; and (3)
there must be an acquiescence or willingness on the part of the invitees
to proceed in spite of the danger.77 The Georgia Court held that as a
matter of law, the plaintiff's assumption of risk for injuries arising out of
occurences common to the event automatically constitutes a fifty percent
contribution to the injury.78 In Sewell v. Dixie Region Sports Car Club of
America, Inc,7 9 the court held that a spectator who ignored the dangers
of up-close videotaping of an auto race met all of the above require-
ments for the assumption of risk standard.80
72. See, eg., Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (1975). Although Knight deals with injuries
that an athlete incurs, similar principles of assumption of risk apply to spectators as well. See
Ann K. Bradley, Note, Knight v. Jewet Reasonable Implied Assumption of Risk as a Com-
plete Defense in Sports Injury Cases, 28 SAN Dmoo L. Rv. 477 (1992).
73. Typcially, these jurisdictions differentiate between invitees, licensees, and trespassers
as well. The designation of a spectator is typically, but not always, an invitee. In these jurisdi-
cations, the use of primary assumption of risk, even in a comparative negligence scheme, is
important.
74. SCHWARTZ, supra note 65, at 972.
75. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 (1988).
76. 367 S.E.2d 866 (Ga. App. 1988).
77. Sewell v. Georgia Region Sports Car Club of Am., Inc., 451 S.E.2d 489,490 (Ga. App.
1994) (citing Newman v. Collins, 376 S.E.d 204 (Ga. App. 1988)).
78. Sewell, 451 S.E.2d at 490.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Georgia Courts appear to be more lenient toward the stadium/event-
site owner for sporting events. For example, recently in Daves v. Shep-
herd Spinal Center, Inc.,81 a Georgia Court held that a spectator at a
wheelchair race was barred from recovery under the defendant's as-
sumption of risk defense.' The spectator-plaintiff had stationed herself
at the bottom of a hill where it could be "reasonably" assumed that the
racers could reach high speeds.8 3 One such racer, travelling at a high
rate of speed, careened off the course and collided with the spectator,
causing severe injury.84 The court held that the plaintiff-spectator had
chosen the location on which to view the race, and having attended other
races should have realized the speeds at which wheelchair racers could
attain.85 Thus, the plaintiff should have realized the potential for a par-
ticipant racer to lose control of the vehicle on a curve at the bottom of a
decline. 6 In situations where the plaintiff should have been aware of a
danger, or the injury results from a common feature of the event, under
a contributory negligence jurisdiction, the plaintiff will be barred from
recovery.
B. Secondary Assumption of Risk in Comparative
Negligence Jurisdictions
Secondary assumption of risk refers to instances in which the defend-
ant owes a duty of care, but the plaintiff-spectator knowingly encounters
the risk.Y Unlike primary assumption of risk, secondary assumption of
risk defenses are subsumed into a comparative fault scheme and the as-
sumption of risk defense does not act as a bar to recovery. 8 Thus, a jury
weighs the responsibility of both parties and accordingly designates a
percentage of fault.89 This is a salient defense in that the majority of
states now utilize a comparative fault rather than a contributory negli-
gence standard. 90
To better understand the use of comparative negligence in a stadium/
event-site owner context, it is helpful to examine diverse jurisdictions.
Baseball stadiums, because of their abundance, provide an obvious ex-
81. 466 S.E.2d 692 (Ga. App. 1996).
82. Id. at 693.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ScHWArz, supra note 65, at 92.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. See LErrR, supra note 63, at 303.
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ample of the different formulations of an owner's duty. California holds
that a stadium owner has a limited duty to provide screened seats for as
many fans as may reasonably be expected to call for them on any ordi-
nary occasion. 91 Additionally, California imposes a duty on the stadium
owner to provide a warning to spectators of the danger of foul balls. 92 If
this duty is met, the plaintiff is barred from recovery. 93
In comparison, the New York Supreme Court held in Akins v. Glens
Falls City School District94 held that the "critical question becomes what
amount of screening must be provided by an owner of a baseball field
before it will be found to have discharged its duty of care to its specta-
tors."' 95 In addition, the court held that the owner was required to pro-
tect the most dangerous section of the field. 6 Finally, the New York
Court held that the number of protected seats provided must be suffi-
cient to accommodate the "spectators who may reasonably be antici-
pated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion. '97
Texas adopted the New York standard enunciated in Akins, above.
However, a Texas Court held in Friedman v. Houston Sports Associa-
tion98 held that a stadium owner has no duty to warn spectators of the
danger of foul balls. The stadium owner's duty is merely to provide "ad-
equately screened seats" for all those desiring them.99
The author argues that California uses a more easily quantifiable
standard than either New York or Texas. Keeping track of ticket sales is
easier than estimating the percentages of foul balls and home runs that
enter the stands in specific areas, in addition to calculating the various
speeds of these balls and predicting injury to a specific spectator. Thus,
although all three jurisdictions use a comparative negligence scheme,
jury outcomes from similar situations may be different because of the
higher duty placed on stadium owners in the New York jurisdiction.
C. "Common Feature of the Event-Nature of the Sport" Standard
By this time, the reader has been exposed to the term "injury arising
out of a common feature of the event" a number of times in this article.
91. Rudnick v. Golden West Broadcasters, 202 Cal. Rep. 900 (Cal. App. 1984).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1981).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 533.
98, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1987).
99. Id. at 575.
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In the context of assumption of risk, the common feature of the event
becomes important in assigning negligence, especially in non-stadium
events. Although secondary assumption of risk is a viable defense in all
comparative negligence jurisdictions, courts have held that the stadium/
event-site owner's duty depends heavily on the nature of the sport itself,
as well as on the defendant's role in, or relationship to, the sport.10
Golf provides an extreme example of how the standard works. For
example, in Morgan v. Fuji Country USA,101 a spectator who was injured
at a golf tournament by an errant ball was not barred from recovery
under the secondary assumption of risk doctrine. However, the Califor-
nia Court held that the duty of a golf course towards a golfer or specta-
tor is to provide a reasonably safe golf course.10 2 Again, whether or not
the golf course met the reasonably safe golf course standard was a ques-
tion for a jury.
Under the California scheme, a jury is faced with two questions.
First, does the stadium/event-site conform to accepted industry stan-
dards for safety? Second, even if the stadium/event-site conforms to in-
dustry standards, did the owner/operator contribute in any other way to
the plaintiff's injuries? Thus, the course owner has an obligation to de-
sign the course "as to minimize the risk that [persons on the course] will
be hit by golf balls, e.g. by the way the various tees, fairways, and greens
are aligned or separated.' '10 3
Such a question presents two obvious difficulties for golf course own-
ers. First, unlike a baseball stadium, establishing an industry standard by
which to judge a breach of duty is problematic. By their very nature,
golf courses do not typically mimic each other. Secondly, where specta-
tors are concerned, unlike most other athletic games, the spectators are
rarely stationary, and the likelihood of a golf-ball related injury is rela-
tive to the quality of the participants in the event. Therefore, golf course
owners may have difficulties under the secondary assumption of risk
scheme in comparison to their stadium owner counterparts.
D. Safe Place Statutes
Almost all jurisdictions utilize safe place statutes that place a higher
threshold of liability on property owners. However, a minority of the
100. See Morgan v. Fuji Country USA., Inc., 40 Cal.Rptr 249 (Cal. App. 1995) (adopting
Knight, 834 P.2d at 696).
101. Iti
102. Id at 253.
103. Id.
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existing safe place statutes actually attach liability to the stadium/event-
site owner. For example, Wisconsin's safe place statute attaches to sta-
dium/event-site owners.0 4 In instances where the owner fails to con-
struct or maintain safety features such as fences, there is a violation of
the safe-place statute.-' Additionally, liability attaches when the sta-
dium or field owner knowingly permits employees and frequenters to
venture into a potentially dangerous area.0 6 Of importance to the own-
ers is that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is barred under the
safe place statute.10 7
Although primarily designed for the protection of employees, the
Wisconsin safe place statute creates protection for persons who frequent
buildings and structures. 08 This includes ballparks, stadiums, and other
places likely to be used for sporting events by spectators. Wisconsin
places a duty on owners to maintain a reasonably safe place for their
frequenters.
104. WXs. STAT. § 101.11 (1988). See Wellner v. Beechwood Fire, 495 N.W.2d 102 (Wis.
Ct. App. unpub. op. 1992).
105. Powless v. Milwaukee County, 94 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1959).
106. Xavier v. Kaiser, 227 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1975).
107. Sachse v. Mayer, 118 N.W. 914 (Wis. 1963).
108. § 101.11 reads:
(1) Every employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe for the employees
therin and shall furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employees
therein and frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards,
and shall adopt and use methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such
employment and places of employment safe, and shall do every other thing reasonably
necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such employees and fre-
quenters. Every employer and every owner of a place of employment or a public build-
ing now or hereafter constructed shall so construct, repair, and maintain such place of
employment or public building as to render the same safe.
(2)(a) No employer shall require, permit, or suffer any employee to go, or be in any
employment or place of employment which is not safe, and no such employer shall fail
to furnish, provide, and use safety devices and safeguards, or fail to adopt and use
methods and processes reasonably adequate to render such employment and place of
employment safe, and no such employer shall fail or neglect to do every other thing
reasonably necessary to protect the life, health, safety, or welfare of such employees or
frequenters; and no employer or owner or other person shall hereafter construct or
occupy or maintain any place of employment, or public building, that is not safe, nor
prepare plans which shall fail to provide for making the same safe.
(b) No employee shall remove, displace, damage, destroy or carry off any safety
device or safeguard furnished or provided for use in any employment or place of em-
ployment, not interfere in any way with the use thereof by any other person, nor shall
any such employee interfere with the use of any method or process adopted for the
protection of any employee in such employment or place of employment or frequenter
of such place of employment, nor fail or neglect to do every other thing reasonably
necessary to protect the life, health, safety or welfare of such employee or frequenters.
WIS. STAT. § 101.11 (1988).
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In the sports event context, the salient Wisconsin case is Kaiser v.
Cook."°9 Kaiser involved a spectator injury at an auto racetrack. The
injury occurred when a flying tire struck a spectator. The court acknowl-
edged that the mere fact an accident had occurred did not demonstrate
that the place was unsafe. However, the court did not look to industry
standards to determine whether the racetrack was operated reasonably.
Rather, the specific question the court fashioned in creating the standard
of negligence was whether the defendant maintained and operated his
racetrack as safely as the nature of a racetrack would reasonably per-
mit.110 Thus, a higher threshold of negligence is placed on the stadium/
event-site owner under the Wisconsin safe place statute than in a com-
parative negligence context. Following the Wisconsin standard, a sta-
dium/event-site owner may be held liable under the safe place statute
not only where a failure to construct protection to the spectators exists,
but also where the owner knowingly permits frequenters into a danger-
ous area."'1
Defendants have raised other defenses under the safe-place statute,
specifically that the statute applies to buildings, and not other construc-
tions. As early as 1935, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that wooden
bleachers used for general public seating at an exhibition football game
constituted a public building under the safe place statute." 2 Nonethe-
less, defendants continued to argue that seating was not an integral part
of a public building if such seating were not attached to the general
structure.1 13 As a result, non-connected bleachers frequently found at
minor league baseball games, college and high school baseball, golf tour-
naments and other exhibitions remained open to question as falling
under the purview of the statute. This question was settled in three cases
discussed below.
In 1959, the court held in Powless v. Milwaukee County Stadium" 4
that the safe place statute applied to an integrated structure. The court
noted that the duty under the safe place statute is an absolute duty." 5
109. 227 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1975).
110. IL at 52.
111. Note that the one exception to this rule pertains to golf courses. See Quesenberry v.
Milvaukee, 317 N.W.2d 468 (Wis. 1984).
112. Bent v. Jonet, 252 N.W. 290, 292 (Wis. 1934).
113. See Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 68 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Wis. 1995). The court in Weiss
noted that the key question is whether the [spectator area] is sufficiently of the character of a
public building constituting a place of assemblage for the general public. Id.
114. 94 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. 1959).
115. Id.
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However, the term "safe" is relative, not absolute.116 While the court
refused to consider other jurisdictions' holdings which did not have ap-
plicable safe place statutes, it recognized that the Wisconsin safe place
statute does not alleviate the duty of spectators to care for themselves. 117
Thus, while assumption of risk was barred as a defense under the safe
place statute, contributory negligence was not. In a comparative negli-
gence scheme, the spectator's failure to exercise care would be taken
into consideration by the jury and weighed against the duty placed on
the stadium/event-site owner.
In Pelock v. Prarie du Chien Joint School District #1,118 the court de-
termined that a ballpark is an integrated structure of fences and bleach-
ers with controlled access. 19 It is designed and used for public resort,
assemblage, and use. 2 ' As such, a ballpark is considered a public build-
ing for the purposes of the safe place statute .'2  Although Pelock is a
case involving an amateur softball tournament, it establishes the basic
principle that the safe place statute applies to all stadium/event-sites. As
a result, Wisconsin places a higher duty of safety on its stadium/event-
site owners than do jurisdictions which look strictly to a reasonableness
standard, or industry standard. Because of the nature of notice, it can be
generally argued that wherever the injury to the spectator arises, the sta-
dium/event-site owner was already on notice of the injury possibility
through prior experience, trade journals, or the media.
1. Recreation Statute Exception
In 1983, the Wisconsin Legislature created an exception to the safe
place statute by enacting the recreational immunity statute.12 2 For own-
ers of private property, there is reduced liability if the owner engages in
recreational activities which do not exceed $2000 annual profit.11 More-
over, there are a number of collection possibilities which do not consti-
tute payment for the purposes of the above aggregate. These include
inter-alia: donations of money or services for the management of the
116. Id.
117. Id. The court also noted that "most baseball fans are eager to retrieve foul balls as
souvenirs. We may mention that the radio broadcasters of 'braves' keep a fishnet handy to
catch balls fouled in the direction of the press box in order to send them to handicapped or
shut in children." Id.
118. 394 N.W.2d 316 (Wis. Ct. App., unpub. op. 1986).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Wis. STAT. § 895.52 (1995).
123. Id at § 895.52(6)(a).
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property; payments of not more than $5 per person per day for permis-
sion to gather any natural product on an owner's property; or a payment
by a governmental body. However, a city baseball association that spon-
sored an amateur baseball team, owned the park in which the team
played, and charged admission was not immune from liability. 2 4 The
city itself was, but not the association.""
Thus, while the typical sports arena owner will probably not be im-
mune from the safe place statute under the recreational exception, small
stadium and event-site owners who host charity tournaments may come
under the protection of the limited immunities from liability encom-
passed in the act. In all likelihood, this is true even if the stadium/event-
site owner exceeds the $2000 limit while engaged in other than charita-
ble business.' 2 6 Thus, for example, if a country club hosted an annual
charity tournament in which it received no pecuniary benefit, the coun-
try club would be immunized from liability by the recreation statute dur-
ing the course of the event.
IV. COMMON INJURIES TO SPECTATORS
A. Injuries Caused by Other Spectators
Courts recognize that injuries can be caused by parties other than the
stadium/event-site owner at sporting events for which the owner can be
held liable. In recent years, the number of spectators who are injured by
other spectators at sporting events has grown considerably. 2 7 The key
question to determine liability is the foreseeability of the injury by the
stadium/event-site operator. A general principle of liability is that an
individual or organization who invites the public to a public amusement
place is liable for injury sustained as a result of the acts of third parties,
under certain conditions. 2 s In the field of spectator sports, a question
often arises as to whether the stadium operator contributed to the dan-
gerous condition. 2 9 More important is the basic question of whether the
stadium operator knew, or should have known, that a dangerous condi-
tion existed.'3 0
124. Kloes v. Eau Claire Cavalier Baseball Ass'n, 487 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
125. d.
126. See Moua by Schilling v. Northern State Power Co., 458 N.W.2d 836 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990), review denied, 461 N.W.2d 445 (1990). See also Douglas v. Dewey, 453 N.W.2d 500
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 454 N.W.2d 805 (1990).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. See Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 167 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1946).
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A salient case in the modem era for injuries caused by unruly specta-
tors is Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Stadium.'31 Although this case is
not per se a sports related case, it involves the liability of stadium owners
for injuries to spectators caused by other spectators. On December 3,
1979, a popular musical group, The Who, performed at Riverfront Coli-
seum in Cincinnati, Ohio. As a result of a narrow entrance and the
stampeding of the spectators, eleven people were trampled to death.
132
The court held that the owners of the stadium failed to take affirmative
steps to adequately and effectively obviate certain known hazards. 33
One of these hazards involved seating arrangements. 34 Important to
the court was that the directors of the event were aware of patron safety
problems at the Coliseum.13 5 While the Ohio court was unwilling to find
that a rock concert cannot be defined as an inherently dangerous event,
the foreseeability context remained salient in determining liability. 36
In a sport related context, foreseeability of the behavior of the audi-
ence is a key element to determining liability. 137 Recently, in Johnson v.
Mid-South Sports, Inc.,'138 an Oklahoma court had the opportunity to ad-
dress this question. The plaintiff in Johnson was injured while at a pro-
fessional wrestling match. Because of his weight and other infirmities,
the plaintiff would have normally sat in a handicapped section.' 39 How-
ever, during the event, the handicapped section was full, so Johnson was
escorted to another section, which contained "rowdy" spectators. 40
While exiting the event, Johnson was assaulted by other fans. Mid-South
Sports argued that they had removed the rowdy fans during the event. 4'
The court determined that there was no indication that Mid-South
131. 465 N.E.2d 904 (Ohio 1983).
132. See Maureen Krislov, Rock in a Hard Place, Determining Mosh Pit Liability at Con-
certs, 11 No. 9 Er. L. & FIN. 3 (1995).
133. Bowes, 465 N.E.2d at 911.
134. Id. at 908. The type of seating available, known as festival seating, is not typical to
paid sporting events. Festival seating is best described as a "first come, first serve basis" ar-
rangement which encourages patrons to enter an area as soon as possible to get the the best
seating. In Bowes, the court noted that there is evidence that festival seating abets pushing
and shoving by large numbers of patrons. Id.
135. Id at 910. The court held that the record is replete with an awareness by its officers
and employees of the safety problems presented by large and uncontrolled crowds at rock
concerts at the Coliseum prior to the incident. Id
136. Krislov, supra note 132, at 5.
137. See Johnson v. Mid-South Sports, Inc., 806 P.2d 1107 (OkI. 1991).
138. Id
139. Id at 1108. The court described the plaintiff as a 295 pound man with an amputated
right arm. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id
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should have foreseen the assault on Johnson because Mid-South's secur-
ity had already removed the rowdy fans and as a result, there was no
indication of any further danger. 42
The majority's holding in Johnson was problematic for two reasons.
First, there was ample evidence that the audience was encouraged to act
in a rowdy or boisterous fashion, both through the nature of the event
and by the high volume sale of alcohol. 143 Whether the sale of alcohol to
intoxicated fans generally constitutes negligence is a question for a
jury.'" The author argues that stadium/event-site owners have been on
notice for many years that intoxicated fans get into fights and otherwise
pose dangers to their surrounding spectators. 145 Thus, where the sale of
alcohol is encouraged-a common feature of spectator events-the
owner should face an additional percentage of liability.
1. Wisconsin Holdings for Spectator Injuries Under the Safe Place
Statute
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Lee v. National League Base-
ball Club146 that a baseball spectator who was injured as a result of being
trampled on while other fans pursued a foul ball was entitled to damages
from the Milwaukee Braves Baseball Organization. The Milwaukee
Braves asserted an assumption of risk defense akin to a spectator being
struck by a ball.147 The court held that unlike a foul ball entering the
stands, it is unlikely, as a matter of common knowledge, that spectators
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1110. In the dissent, Judge Kauger argued that the general rule is that a boxing
or wrestling match promoter or owner is under the same obligation to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition for his invitees, or to warn them of hidden dangers, as one who
controls any other commercial premises open to the public. Id. at 1111.
144. Id.
145. Fighting Fan Violence, Some NFL Teams are Limiting Beer Sales, L.A. Tixrs, Oct. 2,
1990, at C1. The article summarizes that over the previous decade, NFL franchise owners
became aware of the relationship between alcohol sales and spectator rowdiness. As a result,
by 1990, several franchises had employee programs which were designed to train employees to
identify rowdy fans and control sales. Id.
See Bishop v. Fair Lanes Ga. Bowling, Inc., 803 F.2d 1548, 1552 (11th Cir. 1986). The court
held that the sale of beer in conjunction with sporting events has been profitable, but has been
severely limited in a number of stadiums and auditoriums across the country. Police have
reported that alcohol is involved in nearly every ballpark incident they handle. Where the sale
of beer has been limited, arrests and ejections have steadily dropped. Id.
146. 89 N.W.2d 811 (Wis. 1958).
147. Id. (citing Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222 P.2d 19 (1950)). See also Albert J.
Goldberg, Non-Third Party Safe Place Cases, 46 MARQ. L. Rnv. 154 (1962).
1996]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
can expect to be trampled.148 An affirmative duty to maintain efficient
crowd control is placed on the stadium./event-site owner under the Wis-
consin safe place statute.
B. Injuries Caused to Spectators-Third Party Employees
Although this is one of the least typical spectator injuries, a natural
question which arises is whether liability accrues when media personnel,
batboys, assistants, or non-athlete employees are injured. In a 1983 Cali-
fornia-Stanford football game, a member of the Stanford band was in-
jured in a collision with a football player.149 This question was partially
answered in Gallagher v. Cleveland Browns Football Co. 5 0 Michael
Gallagher was employed as a television station videographer to cover
the Cleveland Browns football games. During a 1988 game between the
Cleveland Browns and the Houston Oilers, players collided with Gal-
lagher in the end zone, known as the "Dawg Pound."'5 1 Gallagher sus-
tained injuries and sued for negligence. At trial, he prevailed before the
jury, but the Browns were granted judgement not withstanding the ver-
dict (jnov).15 2 On motion, the Browns asserted a primary assumption of
risk defense. 153 Despite Ohio's comparative negligence recognition, pri-
mary assumption of risk remained a viable defense as a jnov issue be-
cause the risk is a foreseeable or customary part of the sport." 4 The
Ohio Court held that the "application of primary assumption of risk to
sports events requires that the danger involved is ordinary to the game,
it is common knowledge that the danger exists, and the resulting injury
occurs as a result of the danger during the course of the game."'"5 In
general terms, Gallagher asserts that concession vendors, media person-
nel, and even field entertainers will fall under the aegis of spectator for
the purposes of determining liability.
148. Brown, 22 P.2d at 19. The court held that "it boils down to the question of whether it
is a matter of common knowledge that spectators at baseball games who scramble for balls
batted into the stands, are likely to forcibly knock other patrons out of their seats with such
force as to injure them. This could not have been a matter of common knowledge on the part
of the patrons." Id,
149. See, e.g., Stanford Muzzles Its Marching Band, L.A. TimEs, Oct. 31, 1990.
150. 638 N.E.2d 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
151. Id. at 1084.
152. Id, at 1085.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1089.
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V. CONCLUSION
In examining negligence actions and their correlative defenses in
spectator injury cases, the lawyer is left with an unnerving fabric through
which to sift. There are standard, common rules which apply to all ac-
tions. However, in breaking down the law of the various jurisdictions,
the type of injury and whether the injury arose from a common feature
of the event creates complexities. Thus, it is incumbent on the attorney
to realize each of the three dimensions presented in this article.
Although by no means is this a complete survey, it forms a framework
from which to begin.

